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DIVISIONALIZATION IN VERTICAL STRUCTURES
Lluís Bru, Ramon Faulí-Oller and José-Manuel Ordóñez de Haro
A B S T R A C T
We study the incentives to create divisions by a firm once it is taken into account the
vertical structure of an industry. Downstream firms, that must buy an essential input to
upstream firms, may create divisions.  Divisionalization reduces their bargaining power
against upstream firms. This effect must be weighted against the usual incentive to
divisionalize, namely the increase in the share of the final market that a firm obtains through
it. We show that incentives to divisionalize are severely reduced when compared with the
standard results, and that even sometimes firms choose not to divisionalize at all. The paper
also shows the implications of the former analysis on the internal organization of firms and on
the incentives to vertically integrate.
KEYWORDS: Divisionalization; Intermediate Markets; Secret Contracts2
1. Introduction
The literature on oligopoly theory has investigated the incentives of firms to create
divisions that compete independently in a market. Corchón (1991), Baye, Crocker and Ju
(1996) and Corchón and González-Maestre (2000) have obtained the counterintuitive result
that, as  divisionalization costs tend to zero,  Cournot competition leads to the perfectly
competitive outcome, i.e. to the full dissipation of the oligopoly rents, even when there are
only two firms in the industry.
There are several ways to obtain different equilibria from the perfectly competitive
outcome even with zero fixed cost per division. In González-Maestre (2000) firms are able to
delegate output decisions to division managers and shape their behavior through incentives
schemes. In Huck, Konrad and Müller (2001) firms compete in a contest (instead that à la
Cournot). In both papers, incentives to divisionalize are reduced and output is lower than the
competitive.
The present work reevaluates the incentives to  divisionalize when one takes into
account the vertical structure of an industry. Retail firms must buy a basic input from
upstream firms. We assume unobservable contracts between upstream and downstream firms
as in Rey and Tirole (1999), and two suppliers of the input, one of them more efficient than
the other. Downstream firms may create divisions without any fixed set-up cost.
In the literature of divisionalization, firms have a strategic incentive to divisionalize:
the creation of independent divisions commits a firm to a more aggressive behavior that
increases its market share at the expense of rivals. In a vertical relationship, however, there is
a countervailing effect:  divisionalization reduces their bargaining power against upstream
firms. We show below that in a vertical structure incentives to divisionalize are drastically
reduced. In a downstream duopoly, the equilibrium number of divisions is always finite and
thus the perfectly competitive outcome is never attained. Even in some circumstances firms
do not divisionalize at all.
The explicit modelization of the vertical structure allows us to analyze the connection
between upstream and downstream markets. When competition upstream increases,
downstream firms obtain better deals from suppliers. Then the vertical relationship loses
importance and downstream firms focus on the advantages of divisionalization to gain market
share in the final market. Therefore, the more competitive the upstream segment of the
industry, the more competitive is also the downstream segment. This result is in accordance3
with the evolution of different industries, for example in the US food sector, where there has
been a parallel process of consolidation in manufacturing and retailing (Sexton (2000)).
Recently some other papers have recently analyzed the incentives to divisionalize with
an explicit account of the vertical structure of the industry.  Corts and  Neher (1999) and
Chemla (2000) assume, as we do, unobservable supply contracts, but they are interested in
different issues. In Corts and Neher (1999), each upstream firm creates downstream divisions
in order to gain a strategic advantage in the final market against rivals. They show that supply
contracts, even if unobservable, may have strategic effects as long as downstream divisions
are completely independent. Chemla (2000) shows that an upstream firm may encourage the
entry of new downstream firms in order to reduce the bargaining power of the downstream
sector of the industry. Both  Corts and Neher (1999) and  Chemla (2000) study, thus, the
incentives of upstream firms to strengthen competition downstream. Our paper is concerned,
instead, with the incentives of downstream firms to increase competition in order to gain a
strategic advantage against rivals.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly revisits the
framework of unobservable contracts we use to model the vertical relationship between firms,
and we emphasize the aspects of the model that are crucial for our analysis. Each division not
only sets independently its output but also contracts the input independently from other
divisions of the same firm. In this section, we obtain the main result of the paper: firms create
a finite number of divisions and hence final prices are above the competitive level.
In section 3 two extensions of the basic framework are analyzed. First we allow
centralized bargaining with upstream firms within a downstream firm, namely the only
independent choice of a division is its level of output. The analysis shows that firms prefer a
decentralized structure, where divisions both choose sales and input purchases, somewhat
against current opinion that favors central purchasing (Dobson and Waterson (1999)).
In this section we also analyze the possibility that the efficient upstream firm vertically
integrates with one of the downstream firms. Although vertical integration allows the
upstream firm to foreclosure rivals, divisionalization reduces the incentives to do so, because
it results in a very competitive retail segment.
Finally, we draw some conclusions and directions for future research.4
2.  THE MODEL AND ITS MAIN INSIGHT
There is an upstream firm U that produces an intermediate input at marginal cost
0 ‡ c . There exists also a (less efficient) alternative source for the input, a second upstream
firm that produces at marginal cost  c c> . In the downstream sector there are two firms, i = A,
B, that transform one unit of input into one unit of final product without additional costs of
production.
1 The final product is homogeneous and its demand is given by  Q Q P - =a ) ( .
Upstream and downstream firms set vertical contracts that establish the terms under
which inputs are transferred. We model this vertical relationship following the framework in
Rey and Tirole (1999), where contracts are secret (or unobservable) and firms have passive
conjectures. After contracts are set, competition downstream is à la Cournot.
We want to address how the process discussed above is affected by the decision of
downstream firms to act through divisions. Those divisions will be independent both (i) to
bargain with suppliers and (ii) to decide the level of sales in the final market. In contrast with
previous work on  divisionalization that concentrate on point (ii), we want to stress the
importance of the interaction of both decisions. Downstream firms may create as many
independent divisions without any fixed set-up cost as they find it is in their private interest.
2
The full game we consider has thus the following stages:
Stage 1:  Downstream firms A and B decide their firm structure, namely their
number of divisions, nA and nB.
Stage 2:  Upstream firms secretly offer each division a contract; each division
chooses a supplier, orders a quantity of input and pays accordingly.
Stage 3:  Divisions transform input into final product and compete in the final
market à la Cournot.
                                                
1 We could generalize the analysis to the case of more than two downstream firms and the main results would
still hold. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity, we present the results for two downstream firms.
2 They sell those divisions in a competitive market for firms. For instance already existing retailers may sell their
product without any additional cost. This guarantees (i) that each division is an independent firm and (ii) that
firms A and B extract all the surplus to be obtained in product market competition. If contracts with divisions
were secret, we would have a fixed payment equal to the expected surplus of the division.5
Notice that we assume that the level of  divisionalization is chosen before supply
contracts are settled. We believe that divisionalization is a decision that affects firms and
market structure so that it is a decision that cannot be easily changed. Supply contract terms
instead is a conduct decision easier to modify and adapt. The order of the stages in the game
pretend to reflect these considerations.
Upstream firms offer two-part supply contracts. Hart and Tirole (1990) and McAfee
and Schwartz (1994) show that, when supply contracts are secret and divisions have passive
conjectures, the equilibrium in the final product market is unique and characterized by the
Cournot quantities with  B A n n n + =  players that produce at marginal cost  c, because in
equilibrium U serves all divisions, and sets a two-part tariff that has a marginal wholesale
price  c w = . Thus, in equilibrium each division produces  ) (n q
c  and obtains profits  ) (n
c p .
Downstream firms have always the option to use the less efficient input, and produce
at marginal cost  c. Competition between upstream firms drives down payments for input
until downstream firms are indifferent between producing at high and low marginal costs.
More specifically, the efficient firm U supplies all divisions for a fixed fee equal to
( ) { }q c q n q n P Max n
c
q
c - + - - ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( p , and hence each division has net profits equal to the
profits it would obtain off the equilibrium path with the second source of input,
3
( ) { }q c q n q n P Max n
c
q
D - + - ” ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( p . With a linear demand  Q Q P - =a ) ( , each division has
net profits  ( )

































Therefore, in order to evaluate the profits of each division, downstream firms must
take into account the effect of the total number of divisions n in  ) (n
D p .
4 In the earliest stage
of the game, each downstream firm chooses its optimal number of divisions, that is, it solves





p = P  where  j i n n n + = ,  B A, = "i  and  j i „ (1)
                                                
3 Notice that rival divisions expect an agreement between U and each division and thus produce  ) (n q
c .
4 Notice that for a sufficiently high number of divisions, each division faces a residual demand
( ) q n q n P
c + - ) ( ) 1 (  such that  ( ) c n q n P
c < - ) ( ) 1 ( ; in such a case the second source is irrelevant, the efficient
upstream firm may reap all the rents from the vertical relationship and pD is driven down to zero.6
The optimal number of divisions satisfies the first order condition (FOC) of the former
problem. The marginal revenue for downstream firm of an additional division has two terms,
the increase in revenues from an additional division and the reduction in profits per division















The standard literature of divisions shows that with a linear demand the marginal
revenue of divisions is equal to zero, at ni = R(nj) = nj+1. The incentives to obtain a larger
share in the market are so strong that in equilibrium firms dissipate all the rents through an
excessive number of divisions. In our model, the FOC (2) becomes
( ) [ ] 0
) 1 (


































where we define  ( ) { }q c q n q n P Max q
c
q







c c n c
n
- - - -
+
a , i.e. q
off
is the production of a division off the equilibrium path. When we compare the marginal
revenue of an additional division in our case and in the literature we see:
(i)  The profits of a division is now affected by the efficiency of the second
source, because the rents that the upstream firm extracts to the division is increasing in  c ; this
is reflected in the first term in brackets in (3), the mark-up off the equilibrium path, which is
the relevant one for downstream firms.
(ii)  On the other hand, the reduction in profits per division as the number of
divisions increase comes through the change in the production of rivals. This is the second
term in brackets in (3). Rivals produce at low marginal costs (c); this effect is basically the
same in our model as in any other standard paper on divisionalization.
Thus, the vertical structure of the industry reduces the positive incentives to set
divisions, but does not change the negative incentives. For linear demands, when  c  increases
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'  is kept constant. Therefore increases in  c
reduce the incentives to divisionalize.7
Proposition 1 states the result from this discussion.


















































Max n n B A
a .
For low levels of c  but strictly greater than  c , firms divisionalize. For high levels of
c  firms do not divisionalize at all. In any case, downstream firms obtain strictly positive
profits.
Proof. With linear demands the first order condition (3) can be written as
( )( ) ( )( ) 0 1 4 ) ( ) 1 ( 2 0 2 = - + + - - - + - ￿ =
¶
P ¶
i j i i j
i
i
n n n c c n n c
n
a , (4)
B A, = "i  and  j i „ . If we take the number of divisions as a continuum number  1 , ‡ j i n n the
unique solution is the one stated in the proposition. n
The literature of divisionalization has shown that, in an oligopoly market, the strategic
incentives to increase the market share of a firm lead to the full dissipation of oligopolistic
rents through the excessive creation of divisions. To avoid perfect competition as the outcome
of the divisionalization process, previous papers need to impose exogenously a restriction on
the number of divisions that firms may create: an ad-hoc upper bound, fixed costs of
divisionalization, etc. We obtain the same result by taking into account the vertical
relationships within the industry.
Notice from (4) that the optimal number of divisions  ) ( j i n R n =  now satisfies
1 ) ( + < j j n n R . Indeed, for a sufficiently inefficient alternative, in equilibrium downstream
firms do not divisionalize at all, but in any case downstream firms choose a finite number of
divisions.  ) ( j n R  approaches  1 + j n  as c  approaches  c , i.e., as the difference in costs between
suppliers vanishes. Thus we obtain in the limit the standard result (see Baye, Crocker and Ju
(1996) and Corchón (1991)) that, when divisionalization has no fixed costs and the vertical
structure of the industry is assumed away, each firm wants to set one more division than its
rival, which drives them to the competitive outcome.8
Another way to see it is to look at the comparative statics of the final price with



























The final price decreases as c decreases, and converges to the competitive price as the
cost differential vanishes. The decrease in the cost differential may be interpreted as an
increase in competition upstream. Therefore we obtain that more competition upstream is
finally reflected in the final price through an increase in competition downstream. Without
divisionalization, as in Rey and Tirole (1999), the final price does not depend on competition
upstream, because input contracts are efficient. The only effect is that rents are redistributed
between suppliers and downstream firms. In our model, input contracts are still efficient, and
the result is obtained through the effect of upstream rivalry in the number of divisions.
3. EXTENSIONS
In recent years there has been a trend to decentralize decision making inside
organizations in order to give better incentives to agents in charge of taking decisions.
However, it has been recognized that fully decentralized organizations may lose some buyer
power against suppliers. Then, some reports advocate for organizational forms that combine
the decentralization of decision making with some degree of centralization in purchasing
tasks. For instance, hospital management and operating decisions have been decentralized in
many countries. Nevertheless there are proposals to centralize purchases at the global level of
the health system (NHS Procurement Review, 1998). Closer to our framework, in the
European retail sector some of the large buyer groups are purchasing groups that buy goods
from manufacturers for independent retailers (Dobson and Waterson, 1998).
In the previous section, downstream firms are assumed to choose very decentralized
structures because divisions take all decisions, including input purchases. Given the
discussion above, one may believe that downstream firms could improve their performance9
by retaining the purchasing decisions at the firm level. However, as it is shown below,
downstream firms do prefer to maintain the decentralized structure assumed in section 2.
Another issue that we do not take into account in the former section is the possibility
of vertical integration between U and one of the downstream firms. Vertical integration may
be valuable for U in  order to foreclosure the downstream segment (see  Rey and  Tirole
(1999)). We show that vertical integration becomes much less valuable when downstream
firms may divisionalize and that actually in equilibrium vertical integration never occurs.
Therefore the two extensions considered in this section support the analysis in section
2 in the sense that an enlarged model that considers the possibility of centralized structures or
of vertical integration do not alter the predictions of the original model.
3.1. Central purchasing
Assume now that firms A and B may create divisions that independently set their level
of production, and that they may also create a Central Office that would be in charge of
bargaining supply contracts with upstream firms. This means that contractual conditions for
divisions of a firm that creates a Central Office are the same for all of them. If U and the
Central Office do not reach an agreement, all the divisions of the downstream firm must use
the second source of input.
We consider in this section the following game.
Stage 1.  Firms choose at the same time their internal structure (they create a
Central Office in charge of input purchases or they decentralize
completely) and the number of divisions.
Stage 2.  Upstream firms offer secret contracts to downstream firms (to the
central purchasing if a firm is centralized; to divisions in a decentralized
structure). Downstream firms choose a supplier and order input.
Stage 3.  Divisions transform the input into final product and compete in the final
market.
At first sight, centralized bargaining would reduce the problem with divisionalization
observed in the former section (namely that each division has a poor position when setting10
supply contracts).  However we will see that centralized bargaining benefits more the
upstream firm U than the downstream firm that creates a Central Office.
One must take into account that the efficient upstream firm recovers its commitment
power against a downstream firm with a centralized structure. When U offers a contract to a
Central Office, this contract is binding for all the divisions belonging to this firm, and hence
the contract may be used to restrict total production. More formally, when U offers a supply
contract to a downstream firm with a Central Office, it has incentives to offer a two-part tariff
wq T q T + = ) (  with  c w > , i.e., a marginal wholesale price above the marginal cost of
production, in order to induce a more collusive outcome in the final market (which allows U
to reap more rents from this downstream firm).
Consider that firm A has created a Central Office and it is expected a total production
QB from divisions of firm B. The next lemma characterizes the contract that U offers to A.
Lemma 1. The upstream firm U offers a supply contract to firm A with a wholesale
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Min w A B A
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A , ) 1 ( ) 1 (
2
1
a  and a fixed fee per division
{ }   0 ), ( ) ( c w Max T A A p p - = .
Proof. See the appendix. n
Note that wA is equal to  c  only if nA = 1. When  c wA < , firm A produces just the same
as if it had set just one division. In other words, the upstream firm may countervail the
divisionalization effect on the final market through the marginal wholesale price, which
allows U to increase the rents obtained from A through the fixed fee.
Lemma 2 then comes easily.
Lemma 2. For levels of divisionalization such that  c wA <  the optimal number of
divisions for firm A is nA = 1, i.e., not to divisionalize at all.
Proof. Given that divisions of firm B produce a total amount QB  (they react as if firm
A had just one division), total net profits of firm A are
5
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which is a decreasing function of nA.n
For levels of divisionalization that leads to  c wA < , firm A is unable to increase final
production in equilibrium. Net profits of firm  A are the profits obtained off the equilibrium
path, when all its divisions must use the second source of the input. But these profits decrease
in the number of division (as more divisions would imply a more competitive final market off
the equilibrium path), and hence the bargaining power of firm A is decreasing in the number
of divisions.
Only when  c wA = , firm A produces more than if he had just one division, and thus
divisionalization has the usual strategic effect on the final market. The next lemma states the
implications of a central purchasing office on the number of divisions that firm A sets.
Lemma 3.  If  firm A chooses a centralized structure, then its optimal number of
divisions is either nA = nB+1 or nA = 1. For nA = n B+1 to be optimal it is necessary that
c wA =  for such a level of divisionalization.
Proof. See the appendix. n n
Notice that with linear demands a firm with centralized purchasing and  c w =  has just
the same incentives to divisionalize than in the standard literature of divisionalization. This
leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 4. For downstream firms, it is always better to decentralize.
Proof.  We analyze without loss of generality the behavior of firm A.
Assume firm B chooses to decentralize and a given number of divisions nB. Note that,
if A chooses to centralize and to set a number of divisions nA = 1, then it would obtain at least
the same profits with a decentralized structure. On the other hand, profits under a centralized
structure for firm A reaches at  1 + = B A n n  at most a maximum of
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= P a  (and profits are lower if  c wA <   at  1 + = B A n n  and a
higher number of divisions are required for  c wA = ). But these profits may be attained also12
under a decentralized structure with the same number of divisions, and they may be even
higher with the optimal number of divisions under a decentralized structure nA = R(nB ) <
nB+1.
Assume now that firm B chooses to centralize and a given number of divisions nB.
Note again that, if firm A chooses to centralize and to set a number of divisions nA = 1, then it
would obtain at least the same profits with a decentralized structure. On the other hand,











= P a  (and are lower if  c wA <   at  1 + = B A n n  and a higher number of
divisions are required for  c wA = ). But firm A may attain also these profits under a
decentralized structure with the same number of divisions, and they may be even higher with
the optimal number of divisions under a decentralized structure nA = R(nB ) < nB+1. n n
From lemma 4 it is immediate the following proposition.
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In section 2, we assume that the creation of divisions implies to decentralize all the
relevant decisions. In our framework, where we consider a vertical structure, this means that
divisions decide on sales and supplies. Here, downstream firms have more flexibility in the
assignment of tasks to divisions. In particular, they may create a Central Office in charge of
input purchases. Proposition 2 shows that anyway downstream firms prefer a completely
decentralized structure. Hence divisionalization, as usually interpreted in the literature, arises
as an equilibrium outcome.
3.2. The incentives to vertically integrate.
We next study the incentives of the efficient upstream firm to vertically integrate with
one of the downstream firms. If firms U and A vertically integrate, the resulting firm U/A
decides not only the number of divisions it creates but also the number of divisions that are13
centrally controlled.
6 As in section 2, the incentive to create independent divisions is to gain
market share at the expense of competitors. To maintain some divisions under control (i.e. the
possibility to serve the final good directly to consumers) allows U/A to foreclosure rivals in
the input market. We show below that both decisions are intertwined.
More precisely, the timing of decisions that we consider is the following:
Stage 1:  The efficient upstream firm and retail firm A decide whether to
integrate or not.
Stage 2:  Firms decide their number of independent divisions.
Stage 3:  The vertically integrated firm decides the number of centrally
controlled divisions.
Stage 4:  Upstream firms secretly offer each independent division a tariff; each
division then orders a quantity of input to each supplier and pays
accordingly.
Stage 5:  Divisions transform input into final product and compete in the final
market à la Cournot.
If at stage 1 there is no vertical integration, the analysis is the same that in section 2.
So now we focus on the case in which U and A vertically integrate.
In the last stage, divisions compete in quantities. Divisions under control of firm U/A
will maximize joint profits and thus will behave just as one division. Thus we may assume
without loss of generality that U/A sets only one division under its control, if any.
In stage 4, U/A provides internally the input to the controlled division. Further it must
decide whether to serve the input to the remaining divisions. Firm U/A does not distinguish
the independent divisions it has created and divisions created by firm B. Firm U/A would like
to restrict the production of the remaining divisions as much as possible in order to reduce
competition in the final market. Since they can obtain the input from the inefficient upstream
firm at wholesale price  c w = , firm U/A finally serves the input to them at such a price.
7
Therefore there is Cournot competition in the final product market with the division under
                                                
6 This kind of decisions are relevant empirically. Scott (1995) shows that is it usual that firms have both centrally
controlled and independent divisions.
7 This is shown in Hart and Tirole (1990) for the duopoly case.14
control of firm U/A producing at marginal cost  c  and the remaining divisions producing at
marginal cost  c . If U/A does not control one division, supply contracts between U/A and
independent divisions are as in section 2.
In the third stage, U/A must decide whether to create a centrally controlled division.
Denote as nA and nB the number of independent divisions created by firm U/A and firm B,
respectively, in stage 2. When U/A controls one division, its profits are
) ( ) )( (
/ c q c c n n B A
A U - + + p , (7)
where  A U / p are the profits of the controlled division and  ) (c q  is the input that each
independent division buys. On the other hand, when U/A does not control a division, its
profits are as in section two, i.e.




B A n n n n n n + - + + p p , (8)
where as in section 2   ) ( B A
c n n + p  are the Cournot profits when all divisions have marginal
costs  c , and  ) ( B A
D n n + p  are the profits divisions would obtain off the equilibrium path with
the second source.
Lemma 5. For any level of divisionalization (nA, nB), the vertically integrated firm
prefers to create a centrally controlled division.
Proof. See the appendix. n
When firms decide their number of independent divisions in stage 2, according to
lemma 5, they expect partial vertical foreclosure from U/A, through the creation of a centrally
controlled firm. Therefore U/A sets nA to maximize
) ( ) ( ) )( (
/ / c n c q c c n n A B A
A U A U p p + - + + = P , (9)
and B sets nB in order to maximize
) (c nB
B p = P , (10)15
where   ) (c p  are the profits that independent divisions expect to obtain in the last stage, and
are equal to the Cournot profits when nA + nB firms produce at marginal costs  c and one firm
(the division under U/A’s direct control) produces at cost  c .
Vertical foreclosure by firm U/A implies that firm B has the standard strategic
incentives to divisionalize, because independent divisions are served at a constant wholesale
price  c . In opposition to what happened in section 2, the number of divisions does not affect
the supply contracts that are going to be signed and therefore the countervailing force to limit
the number of divisions disappears.
For firm U/A, matters are more complicated. Firm U/A obtains market revenues from
the centrally controlled division and from selling the input to independent divisions,
) ( ) )( (
/ c q c c n n B A
A U - + + p . Moreover it obtains profits from selling independent divisions,
) (c n Ap . The former profits decrease in the number of divisions because it induces more
competition in the final market. But U/A erodes market share to B through the creation of
divisions, and hence has incentives to create them. The following lemma shows which is the
final outcome of this trade-off.
Lemma 6. The optimal number of independent divisions for the vertically integrated
firm is nA = R(nB) = nB, and the optimal number of divisions for firm B is nB = R(nA) = nA+2.
Then in equilibrium the final  price is  c .
Proof. See the appendix. n
The efficient upstream firm would vertically integrate with firm A, as Hart and Tirole
(1990) already noted and lemma 5 establishes in our model, to foreclosure firm B and reduce
in this way competition downstream. But this tactic backfires because it has the side effect to
promote the creation of divisions, to the point that vertical integration and divisionalization
lead to perfect competition in equilibrium. In the final market there is a firm (the division that
is still under U/A's control) that produces at marginal cost  c  the quantity  c c q - = , whereas
the remaining firms produce an aggregate level of production  ) ( ) ( c c c - - - a . The integrated
firm obtains total profits (profits of its divisions plus profits from selling the input to the
industry)  ) )( (
/ c c c
A U - - = P a .
Now, it is worth to vertically integrate? Without vertical integration, U is unable to
commit to high input prices. The vertically integrated firm U/A, instead, may commit to16
foreclosure rivals. But divisionalization has the side effect to create a very competitive market
through the creation of independent divisions.
The following proposition compares joint profits when U and firm A do not vertically
integrate (i.e. the profits they obtain in section 2) with profits when they do integrate.
Proposition 3. Firms U and A obtain more profits when they do not integrate.
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* = P  respectively, where 
* * + = B A n n n . If they do integrate, their joint profits are
) )( (
/ c c c
A U - - = P a . Simple computation shows that joint profits are higher without
integration,   = P - P + P
A U A U / ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) c c c c c
c c
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as  1 > =
* *
B A n n  .  n
From proposition 3 one may conclude that vertical integration will not be observed in
our setup. Divisionalization changes the usual wisdom that upstream firms have incentives to
vertically integrate to foreclosure rivals. Notice that consumers would clearly benefit from
vertical integration, as firms would have strong incentives to divisionalize and this would lead
to a very competitive downstream industry. But this is just why vertical integration does not
happen: only the division under U/A’s control would obtain strictly positive profits. The
profits of the remaining downstream divisions would be completely dissipated. A
disintegrated industry, instead, and as we have shown in section 2, implies lower incentives to
divisionalize, and hence higher profits in the industry as a whole.
4.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has analyzed the incentives of downstream firms to create divisions when
we take into account the vertical structure of an industry. We show that firms divisionalize
less that what was suggested in previous related work. Excessive divisionalization reduces the17
bargaining power against upstream firms, and this effect countervails the usual strategic
incentive to divisionalize in order to gain market share in the final market.
In a first analysis, we have assumed that downstream firms were forced to decentralize
all decisions to divisions. In our framework, where we consider a vertical structure, this
means  that  divisions decide on output and procurement. We have analyzed then the
possibility that downstream firms may create less decentralized internal structures, where a
central office is in charge of input purchases. We have shown that downstream firms prefer
the decentralized structure. Hence divisionalization, interpreted as a decentralized structure,
emerges as an endogenous decision. We have also considered vertical integration as a
mechanism to foreclosure the downstream segment. We show that vertical integration
becomes much less valuable when downstream firms may divisionalize.
We have shown in this paper that the level of competition upstream is reflected in the
level of competition downstream. For products for which upstream firms were able to extract
more rents from the downstream segment, it should be observed fewer retailers selling the
good. Thus, our results suggest a stylized fact that could be analyzed empirically in future
research.18
 APPENDIX
Proof of lemma 1. The upstream firm chooses the contract (per division)
q w T q T A A + = ) ( , given an expectation on the level of production  QB , that solves the
following problem:
{ } A w A T
Max
, { } ) ( ) ( ) ( A A A A A w q c w T w n - + - p    subject to    c wA £    and     ) ( ) ( c T w A A p p ‡ - ,
that amounts to solve the problem
A w



























2      subject to     c wA £ .
Then we obtain the values for wA stated in the lemma.  n
Proof of lemma 3. Assume that the level of divisions of firm A, nA, is sufficiently
high for  c wA = . If firm B has settled a decentralized structure, in equilibrium, we have nA
firms that produce at cost  c  and nB firms that produce at cost  c . Each division of firm A
obtains a profit  ( )
2
2 ) ( ) (
) 1 (
1




A - - -
+ +
= a p , and total profits  A A
A n p = P  reach
a maximum at nA = nB + 1. If firm B sets also has settled a centralized structure, then in
equilibrium all firms work at  cost   c , each division of firm A obtains now a profit
( )
2
2 ) 1 (
1
c
n n B A
A -
+ +
= a p , and again total profits  A A
A n p = P  reach a maximum at nA = nB
+ 1.
For a given structure of firm B, if at nA = nB + 1 the upstream firm sets  c wA < , then
profits for firm B are strictly higher at nA = 1 than for any nA > nB + 1 for which  c wA = : For
the minimum nA  such that  c wA = , divisions of firm B would set the same level of production
QB, and from lemma 2 firm A would obtain higher profits with just one division. And
furthermore profits are decreasing in the number of divisions nA as long as nA = nB + 1.  n
Proof of lemma 5. The vertically integrated firm must compare profits when it
controls a division,19
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with profits if it leaves out the retail stage (all its divisions are independent),
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Simple computation shows that profits are higher in the first case. n
Proof of lemma 6. The integrated firm chooses the number of divisions  nA that
maximize
( ) ( )+ - - -
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where the first term are the profits of its retail subsidiary (the division still owned by the
vertically integrated firm), the second term are the profits obtained selling the input, and the
third term are the profits obtained from creating  nA independent divisions. The optimal
number of divisions for the vertically integrated firm is nA = R(nB) = nB . For firm B, the
optimal number of divisions maximizes
( )
2







B - - -
+ +
a
and it is nB = R(nA) = nA +2.  n20
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